This paper is concerned with the contrast between simulation-and deduction-based approaches to reasoning about physical objects. We show that linear logic can give a uni ed account of both simulation and deduction concerning physical objects; it also allows us to draw a principled distinction between simulation and deduction, since simulations correspond to cut-free proofs, whereas deductions correspond to proofs in general.
Introduction
Let us begin with a common sort of problem. Suppose that we have a description of the initial state of a physical system, and also a description of some actions performed on it; the problem is to describe the nal state. We may contrast two approaches to this problem; the rst would start with a mathematical object which was isomorphic, in appropriate respects, to the physical system, together with appropriate transformations of that mathematical object corresponding to the actions. We would then apply the transformations to the mathematical object, and calculate the result. The other approach would be to axiomatise the behaviour of the system in a suitable logical theory, and then nd out what the result was by performing appropriate deductions in that theory. This is, as posed, simply a distinction about computation in the abstract: it may become concrete in a variety of ways. We may, on the one hand, have to compute the answers on a real computer, so we might like to know which strategy is more feasible, or more accurate. On the other hand, we might like to know what we ourselves do when we think about physical objects { do we do it by simulation, or by deduction? These two versions of the distinction in uence one another, and will continue to in uence one another, quite considerably: models of computation have an important in uence on the philosophy of mind. Computation is one of our main paradigms for giving some sort of physically realisable account of mental phenomena, and the details of our model of computation are thus incorporated { whether we like it or not { in our theory of mind. 1 However we might like to elaborate the original distinction, and however we might use it, there is a fundamental question underlying it: is there any principled distinction to be made between simulation and logical deduction? And the real worry is this: we might be able to axiomatise the simulating structure in such a way that talk about the simulation becomes equivalent to deduction in the logical theory describing the simulating structure (see 8, p . 131]). If, then, we can perform such a wholesale reduction, the distinction might seem to be in danger of collapse.
Simulation and the Frame Problem
Here is a very simple example of simulation-based reasoning: this account was originally developed, for purely practical goals, by H olldobler and Schneeberger 10]. We are reasoning about a domain consisting of medium sized physical objects: traditionally one considers blocks on a table. We would like to reason correctly and e ciently about actions performed on the blocks: stacking one block on another, taking a block o another, putting a block on the table, and so on. What we may think of as \atomic" facts will be simulated by terms representing them: thus, the fact that block b 1 is on block b 2 will be represented by the term on(b 1 ; b 2 ). If we have a situation in which several of these atomic facts { say p 1 ; : : : ; p n { hold, then we will represent that situation as p i : : : p n ;
where is a connective which is de ned to be associative and commutative, and to have an identity. So we have objects, of some sort, which represent our situations: we now have to represent the e ects of actions on the situations.
Consider the action of removing block b 1 from b 2 and placing it on the table;
we will represent it as the rewrite rule on(b 1 ; b 2 ) on(b 1 ; table) : The e ect of this rule on a situation containing the fact on(b 1 ; b 2 ) will be twofold: rstly, it will erase that fact, and secondly it will replace it with the fact on(b 1 ; table) . This, then, is our simulation: it has two notable advantages, which it is worth emphasising in some detail.
E ciency
Firstly, such simulations are computationally e cient. These rewrite systems (they are called ACI-rewrite systems) are computationally very tractable, and it was this which rst recommended their use. By contrast, the standard logical treatment of problems like these is far from tractable. Why should this be so?
We should notice rst that, because of the frame problem, any logic that can handle this problem successfully must be non-monotonic; that is, if we can derive conclusion C from premises , then we may not be able to derive C from a larger set of premises 0 . This is because, typically, we want to be able to deduce that an atomic fact persists unchanged if none of the premises entail that it is changed: for example, the action described above will not change the colour of the blocks, and we want to be able to derive this from the information we are given. However, if we are given additional information { for example, if we are also told that the blocks have been repainted { then we do not want to derive that conclusion any more.
However, the standard non-monotonic logics are computationally intractable 2, 3, 4]. This hardly seems accidental: the non-monotonicity which is necessary to handle the frame problem also means that these logics allow very direct encodings of standard intractable problems { for example, the problem of deciding whether a graph has a three-colouring or not.
Faced with this intractability, the response of many people in arti cial intelligence { for example, Shanahan 17 ] { has been to use logic solely as metatheory, and to write computer programs, using normal programming rather than logic, in order to provide real-time results; these programs can be veri ed using the non-monotonic logic, but the logic is de nitely not doing what human reasoners seem able to do, namely to reason tractably about systems of the sort we are considering.
Correctness
There are further problems, however, for the logical approach. There is, by now, a fairly large body of examples on which the standard logical approach gives the wrong answers, whereas rewrite systems are correct (and there do not seem to be any examples where the logical approach is correct and rewrite systems are incorrect). There is a collection of examples, mainly to do with electrical circuits, in 19], and also a particularly simple example in 21].
The problem seems to be this: the standard approach to the frame problem looks for the situation which, given that it contains the results of any actions that take place and their consequences, is closest to the original sit-uation. Thus, it is hoped, we could show that una ected atomic facts are unchanged because, if they were changed, we would have a situation which was further from the starting situation than the correct one. Although this is a very persuasive intuition { much of the AI literature cites David Lewis 11] in support { it does not seem to hold in full generality. The example of 21] is quite revealing: we have two balls, connected by a string of length 1, and they are initially lying on a table with the string slack. The action is to raise one of the balls to a position two units above the table; the correct nal situation, of course, is that the other ball ends up one unit o the table and the string is taut. If we look for the least changed situation, we nd that both balls are at height 2; this is closer to the starting situation than the correct one, because in this one the string remains slack, so only two atomic facts change (those giving the positions of the balls), whereas in the correct situation all three atomic facts change. By contrast, it is easy to give a rewrite system that gives the correct results 21]; Thielscher 18 ] has a similar treatment of this sort of problem.
Things Inside Us
There is one immediate objection to be made to psychological applications of this story: however we may reason about physical objects, we cannot reason by simulation, because we do not have the sort of mental access to them that we need. As Heal puts it, . . . on this kind of story it is (logically at least) possible that we should use the simulation] strategy for . . . non-mental items, provided we have specimens of them inside us. So we cannot use anything like this`simulation' method to understand galaxies. . . 8, p. 133] This is plausible, but a bit too fast. The sort of reasoning that we are simulating is very generic: it has to do with very bare properties of persistence and change. If we have, \inside us", items which can change their states in some respect or other, and if these items can be made to represent things in the world, then appropriate changes in these internal items can be used to simulate things in the world. Now direct neurological evidence of this sort of thing is lacking, but there are examples of neural nets which exhibit the sort of state change behaviour that we need: they are known as Hop eld nets 14, Chapter 13] and can also be described by mathematical structures known spin glasses.
Erasing
We should notice that there is one key element in this generic reasoning about change: namely the capacity to erase. Rewrite rules, such as those we have been discussing, take elements of a situation, erase them, and replace them with others. It is this which distinguishes this sort of formal system from logical systems: logical systems { classical logical systems, and also nonmonotonic systems of the usual sort { do not erase. This is responsible for much of the ine ciency of the usual logical approaches to the frame problem. Consider a putative inference, of the sort We now have to have other, complex axioms, called frame axioms, which enable us to derive unchanged propositions in one situation from their counterparts in other situations. And it is these frame axioms which cause the ine ciency in logical treatments of this problem: they are there because the relation between corresponding propositions in di erent situations is not one of identity, and this relation cannot be identity because we cannot, in classical logic, erase premises of a deduction. By contrast, if we simulate change by rewrite systems, then we can erase part of the input states, and, correspondingly, we can represent lack of change by identity.
Logic
There are still objections to a simulation-based account, which we would like to be able to deal with. One uses what is called, in the philosophy of mind, cognitive penetrability: our reasoning tends to be in uenced by our beliefs, and it has been claimed that such in uence cannot be accommodated in a simulation-based account of reasoning. A related objection is that { even on the simulationist account { we can reason by simulation, and reason explicitly by theory, about the same topic, and we need some explanation of how it is that we can be using the same concepts in both ways of reasoning; following Peacocke, Davies calls this \the requirement of referential coherence" 5, p. 100]. These issues, however, are important in other areas than the philosophy of mind. It is rare that problems can be solved by pure simulation: usually we might have to use some appropriate combination of simulation and reasoning. For example, we might be given partial information about a system's initial state, and partial information about its nal state, and we would be required to work out, from this partial information, some temporal evolution of the system meeting the constraints.
For this reason, then, we would like to have an integrated account of both simulation and theorising. But, of course, once we do have such an integrated account, the collapse of simulation into deduction seems more and more inevitable. Indeed, there is a basic asymmetry between the two positions. As Heal remarks 9], theory-based accounts are \imperialist": that is, they claim that all reasoning in a given area is theoretical reasoning. Simulation accounts, by contrast, tend to be more modest: they only claim that a signi cant amount of reasoning is simulation, and are prepared to admit that there are clear cases of theorising in most areas of reasoning. The task, then, is to describe how simulation and theorising can both be accommodated in a uni ed account, and, having given such a uni ed account, to see whether any principled distinction can be drawn.
Linear Logic
Linear logic was invented by Girard 6] : roughly it is obtained by taking a sequent calculus presentation of classical logic and removing the structural rules of contraction and weakening 2 . A sequent calculus for linear logic is given in Figure 1 .
The absence of the structural rules has interesting consequences. Firstly, the classical connectives bifurcate: we get two inequivalent versions of conjunction and disjunction. This is because, in classical logic, we can think of two ways of writing the right rule for conjunction, namely ?`B; ?`A^B; Now if we have contraction and weakening, these two rules are equivalent. However, they are not equivalent without the structural rules: so they de ne two inequivalent connectives. The rule on the left, which splits the context of the conclusion into contexts for the premises, de nes ; the rule on the right, which copies the context of the conclusion into each of the premises, We should also notice that linear logic allows us to erase, and, more generally, to deal with rewrites. We have, for example, the following proof: us an approach to the frame problem in which lack of change is represented by identity; it is thus computationally tractable 20, 22] , unlike the standard approach. In fact, the search for a computationally tractable solution to the frame problem led Bibel 1] to the system of linear logic before Girard's paper was published. More than this is, of course, needed. We want to be able to combine actions, using operators like sequence, which executes one action after another, and nondeterministic choice, which chooses between a pair of actions. We can, in fact, express such operations using the linear logic connectives 24]. Furthermore, a solution to many problems { such as the balls and string example described in 2.2 { will depend on executing rewrites until the process terminates (this is analogous to Sandewall's \transition cascade semantics Now we can put the ingredients together and show how simulation and reasoning are related to one another. Let us consider an example: it will be an extremely simple-minded example, but it will illustrate the principles. Suppose that we have, as above, blocks on a 1 . Suppose now that we execute and a large number of times in alternation; we want to show that b 1 remains where it was, on the table. Now clearly, for any xed number of times, we can solve the problem by simulation: we can run through all of the changes that the blocks undergo, and verify that, at the end, the position of b 1 is unchanged. But this would be desperately tedious: the natural way to approach this would be to establish that, however many times we alternate and , the position of b 1 stays the same. Can we establish something like this?
So how are deduction and simulation here related to one another? As we show in more detail in the appendix, we can represent the actions and situations in linear logic as above, so that a valid sequent ; ` 0 corresponds to performing action in a situation yielding a situation 0 . We can also de ne suitable tests on the resulting situations.
Suppose now that we want to establish P(N 0 ) If we alternate and 64 times, then b 1 is still on the table. for some large number N 0 . We might think of establishing 8N: P(N) For all N, if we alternate and N times, then b 1 is still on the table. but this would demand a treatment of induction in linear logic, which would escape the bounds of the paper. However, we can nd a similarly economical (but more elementary) proof of, for example, P(128); we rst establish a lemma Doubling P(N) P(N)`P(2N).
So, given a proof of P(1), we can establish successively P(2); P(4); : : :; P(128).
This proof, although it is concise, and although it is a proof, is not cut free: it uses several lemmas, particularly the doubling lemma. So we can apply cut elimination to it, and obtain a cut free proof of P(128). Now we can also show, by examining our representation of actions, that any cut free proof of a proposition like P(128) must have the character of a simulation: that is, it must have a large number of subproofs, of which the rst derives a situation s 1 from the starting situation and the action , the second derives a situation s 2 from s 1 and the action , and so on, nally deriving the resulting situation and applying the test to it. This is, of course, terribly wasteful { although not as wasteful as doing the whole thing in non-monotonic logic { because many of these subproofs are identical; but it is wasteful in exactly the same way that a simulation-based approach to the problem is wasteful, and it uses the fragment of linear logic that we have used to represent rewrite systems.
Cut free proofs, then, can be regarded as simulations, and we have arrived at a principled distinction between reasoning and simulation: simulations correspond to cut free proofs, whereas reasoning will correspond to proofs in general. Furthermore, we have both reasoning and simulation in the same system: we are not banishing reasoning to the metatheory, unlike some accounts.
A Proofs
We give here some proofs for the assertions of the previous section. First we show how we represent situations. We assume that we are given a suitable collection of ground terms such as on(b 1 ; table), on(b 2 ; b 1 ), and so on; we call these the elementary situation terms.
We need to be able to build situations up from these terms in an associative, commutative way; for this, the normal is almost, but not quite, suitable. The main problem is that, if we want to be able to apply arbitrary tests to situations, we cannot have ?; A B` becoming ?; A; B` and then having A and B wandering o into di erent parts of the prooftree; we want to be able to keep all components of a given situation together at all times. We also wish to be able to quantify over situations. De nition 2. A situation is a proposition of the form (X), where X is a tensor product of elementary situation terms.
We also de ne primitive actions and :
De nition 3. . . . These are the 2 r iterates of a; we are de ning these directly so that we do not have to do any induction at all in our proofs.
Now for the proposition that we want to prove. We can assume that we are starting with a situation in which we have on(b 2 ; b 1 ); this means that all of our actions succeed. We want to show, not just that they succeed, but that they preserve the validity of` (s). More formally, we have the following: Having established this, we can go on to prove the general result for ( ; ) (n) . We need some notation, since the formulae are getting a little unwieldy.
De nition 7. For any proposition a (which will usually represent an action) (128) )`#(( ; ) (128) ) !L !#(( ; ) (128) )`#(( ; ) (128) ) cut #(( ; ) (128) )
